SUISSEMUN XII

COMISSION GUIDE

COMMISSION

GROUP OF TWENTY

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Length of the position paper: Maximum 10 pages, 5 per topic. Minimum 6 pages, 3 per topic.

The opening remarks and the position paper must be written in the third person.

Topics:

- Topic A: The economic impact of the war between Russia and Ukraine on global financial, energy and food stability.
- Topic B: Geopolitical and economic implications of the United States interest in the acquisition of Greenland and its impact on the international order.

About G20:

The Group of Twenty (G20) is an international forum that brings together some of the world's leading economies with the aim of coordinating economic, financial, and increasingly social and environmental policies. Its primary purpose is to promote global economic stability, foster sustainable growth, and strengthen international cooperation in the face of global challenges such as climate change, financial crises, inequality, and sustainable development.

It was created in 1999 in response to the financial crises of the late 1990s, initially as a forum for dialogue among finance ministers and central bank governors. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the G20 gained greater prominence by including meetings of heads of state and government, becoming one of the main forums for global economic decision-making.

Currently, the G20 comprises 19 countries and the European Union. Its members are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in addition to the European Union. Together, these countries account for

approximately 85% of global GDP, 75% of international trade, and nearly two-thirds of the global population, making the G20 a key player in global governance.

In addition to its permanent members, the G20 invites other countries and international organizations to participate as observers, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization, among others. These entities contribute to technical analysis and the development of proposals to address global challenges.

It is important for delegates to understand that the G20 operates by consensus and that its decisions reflect negotiations among countries with diverse interests. Therefore, the analysis of each issue must consider both the national perspective of each member and the global impact of the decisions.

The economic impact of the war between Russia and Ukraine on global financial, energy and food stability.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine dates back to 2014; however, it erupted in February 2022 with Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine. This action was condemned by the United Nations General Assembly as a violation of the United Nations Charter. This represents one of the greatest economic shocks of the century. More than four years later, it continues to have a significant impact on the global market, with the greatest impact felt in the energy and food sectors.

COVID-19 had already caused disruptions in global supply chains, leading to inflation and instability in food and energy systems. The war came at a vulnerable time for the global economy, acting as a catalyst for a crisis that was already brewing. According to the IMF, this war worsened pre-existing tendencies such as rising inflation, extreme poverty, food insecurity, environmental degradation, and deglobalization, all these in addition to the destruction of physical capital. The impact on financial markets was immediate. Stock markets saw immediate declines, and companies in the raw materials and energy sectors with the strongest ties to the countries directly involved in the conflict posted losses of up to 6%.



Both Russia and Ukraine hold and have held a strategic position in the global economy. Russia is the world's second-largest exporter of oil and, until 2022, was the leading exporter of natural gas. Russia accounts for nearly one-third of global fertilizer exports. As for Ukraine, it is the world's fifth-largest exporter of wheat and the third-largest exporter of corn. It is the leading exporter of sunflower oil, accounting for nearly half of these exports at 46%. And it has a vital corridor for global exports, which is its access to the Black Sea.

Since 2022, Ukraine's GDP has contracted by approximately 30%. Although it grew by 3.5% in 2024, growth has slowed due to attacks on its energy infrastructure. Its unemployment, poverty, and inequality rates have risen significantly. Taken together, these figures reflect an economy severely affected by the war, though one capable of sustaining its institutions and basic functioning. However, the scale of the damage makes an independent recovery in the short term unlikely. With reconstruction costs far exceeding its GDP, a significant external financing gap, and high military spending, Ukraine is structurally dependent on international support. For the international community, this raises the need for a coordinated response, not only in terms of assistance, but as a key factor for global economic stability. The effects of this crisis are already being felt in food security, financial markets, and regional stability, and a further deterioration could deepen these disruptions, testing the multilateral system's ability to respond effectively to large-scale crises.

The war triggered an energy crisis in Europe, as Russia supplied 40% of the gas used by the European Union. This led to a threefold increase in the price of natural gas and the need to seek other alternatives. Liquefied natural gas exported by the U.S., Qatar, and Norway

offered an alternative, but at a higher cost. Oil prices also rose significantly, thereby affecting transportation and production costs globally. Also, a significant rise in global food prices is present, particularly in the early months of the conflict. Basic products such as wheat, corn, and soybeans saw sharp increases, while sunflower oil faced shortages in Europe, driving up the prices of its substitutes. In addition, rising fertilizer costs—due to their reliance on natural gas—impacted agricultural production, particularly in developing countries. Taken together, these factors reduced production and worsened global food insecurity.



International responses to the economic impact of the war have been structured around three main pillars: financing, food security, and energy. In the financial sphere, notable programs include the International Monetary Fund's Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the World Bank's Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction, and Reform Trust Fund (URTF). Added to this is coordination through the Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform (MDCP), which brings together the G7, international financial institutions, and donors to channel aid and avoid duplication. In terms of food security, initiatives such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, mediated by the United Nations and Turkey, made it possible to temporarily maintain Ukrainian agricultural exports. Following their suspension, the European Union promoted the Solidarity Lanes as alternative routes, while the World Food Programme has expanded assistance operations in affected regions. In the energy sector, the European Commission's REPowerEU plan has been central to reducing dependence on Russian gas, accompanied by the expansion of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market and new energy interconnections. Finally, economic sanctions have been coordinated primarily by the Group of Seven and the European Union, including measures such as a price cap on Russian oil, a

freeze on central bank assets, and restrictions on the financial system. These have had significant effects, but they have also contributed to the restructuring of global trade and financial flows.

The war has accelerated the fragmentation of the global financial system, weakening economic integration and fostering the formation of blocs and alternative systems. At the same time, it has intensified global inflation, leading to restrictive monetary policies that have particularly affected emerging economies through increased debt, capital outflows, and exchange rate volatility. In the productive sector, rising fertilizer prices—linked to higher gas costs—have reduced agricultural output and exacerbated food insecurity, jeopardizing progress in global development. Added to this is the impact of mass population displacement, which entails a loss of human capital for Ukraine and economic pressures for host countries. Although sanctions have been a key instrument of economic pressure, their effectiveness has been limited by evasion mechanisms, highlighting the challenges of implementing economic measures in an increasingly fragmented global system.

Guiding questions:

1. What measures has your country taken to respond to the economic consequences of the war on financial markets, energy supply, and food security?
2. To what extent is your country affected by rising energy prices, and how has it adapted its energy strategy as a result of the conflict?
3. How has the disruption of agricultural exports from the region impacted your country's food security or trade policies?
4. What is your country's position on economic sanctions, and how have these measures affected its economy or international relations?
5. What role should your country or organization play within the G20 to address these global economic disruptions?

Key words:

1. Inflation
2. Monetary policy

3. Economic sanctions
4. Energy supply
5. Energy diversification
6. Food security
7. Grain exports
8. Fertilizers
9. Supply chains
10. Multilateral cooperation

For more information go to:

https://youtu.be/YS9THYnLAhE?si=CSPwyKw-0TD9hTE- **(Explanation video)**

https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2022/03/the-long-lasting-economic-shock-of-war **(International Monetary Fund)**

https://www.iea.org/topics/russias-war-on-ukraine **(Impacts on energy markets and stability)**

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729367/EPRS_ATA(2022)729367_EN.pdf **(Impact on food stability)**

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/757783/EPRS_BRI(2024)757783_EN.pdf **(Economic impact on the European Union)**

https://www.iisd.org/articles/policy-analysis/russia-ukraine-trade-implications?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=22208053183&gbraid=0AAAADQ3eTATUnv0YlMgH3Q0i9-e30J1W&gclid=Cj0KCQjw_b_QBhCSARIsAP6hR4eK_rcz_5FDvvclzHm-6UX-LU1Ww9QLLo39HoaLa0zZA-JfyyrZ0w4aAmBVEALw_wcB **(Impact in the Global Economy)**

Geopolitical and economic implications of the United States interest in the acquisition of Greenland and its impact on the international order.

Greenland is the world's largest island and an autonomous territory belonging to the Kingdom of Denmark. Its geographic location provides the United States with a strategic advantage that no other territory can offer. The Piuffic Space Base is the only military base the United States has in the Arctic, and it is located on Greenlandic soil. It is an essential base for U.S. monitoring and intelligence operations. Additionally, it controls the GIUK Gap—a strait between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom—which is vital for U.S. naval defense, as it allows for the detection of enemy submarines transiting the area. Finally, the most direct trajectory of missiles launched from northwestern Russia passes through Greenland. This makes the island essential for monitoring them and for U.S. defense.



Greenland's economy is small, so it is heavily dependent on the Kingdom of Denmark. The Greenlandic government has considered and is seeking independence; however, this is a major factor preventing it from achieving independence. Ninety percent of its exports consist of fishery resources, so without diversification, independence is highly unlikely, especially when other factors are also considered.

Greenland is rich in minerals, yet these resources—known as rare earth elements—remain underutilized. This under-exploitation stems from various factors, including temperatures that make extraction difficult, the lack of roads connecting settlements, and laws such as

those prohibiting uranium mining, as well as the absence of active commercial mines. Added to this is the superiority of infrastructure in countries such as Australia, Canada, and even the United States. In 2025, Greenland's Minister of Resources warned that she might consider Chinese investors if the European Union and the United States did not decide regarding mining investments.

For the United States, it is also a strategy to protect itself, since China controls between 60 and 90 percent of global rare earth production. And the United States is dependent on imports, which account for 67 percent of its rare earth supply. Dependence is dangerous because any delay in imports or rise in prices makes a sector of their economy vulnerable.



The U.S. claim to Greenland directly conflicts with four pillars of international law: Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (prohibition of the use of force against territorial integrity), the principle of self-determination established in the same Charter and in the International Covenants on Human Rights (ICCPR and ICESCR), the common law principle against territorial acquisition by force, and the direct warnings from the OHCHR (January 2026) and the European Parliament (Resolution A10-0103/2026) demanding that the U.S. respect international law.

Trump's remarks on Greenland sparked a wave of criticism from Western allies: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz publicly expressed "concern"; French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot directly warned Trump against threatening the EU's borders; Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr and British Foreign Secretary David Lammy reacted negatively; Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declared the Arctic a zone of Russian national interest;

and USC Dornsife warned that the use of sanctions or force by the U.S. could jeopardize the continuity of its participation in NATO, prompting Europe and Canada to form a new collective defense organization.

The Arctic, once a hub of multilateral cooperation, has fractured along two simultaneous fronts: Russia's invasion of Ukraine has brought the Arctic Council to a standstill, and U.S. ambitions regarding Greenland are deepening divisions among allies. As Russia expands its military fleet in the north and China advances its Polar Silk Road, the only institutional circumpolar forum remains paralyzed.

Solutions have been proposed, such as expanding the 1951 U.S.–Denmark Defense Treaty—an agreement that already grants Washington broad authority to conduct military operations in Greenland, including at the Pituffik base—to include a greater military presence and new radar facilities, which would allow the U.S. to achieve its security objectives without the need for territorial sovereignty. The renewal of the U.S.-Greenland Memorandum of Understanding on Critical Minerals has also been proposed, with direct financing from the U.S. Export-Import Bank for projects such as Tanbreez. At the multilateral level, the creation of a G7/G20 investment fund has been proposed to develop Greenlandic mining under environmental standards agreed upon with the local government. Finally, the EU's Critical Raw Materials Act (CRM Act) and the agreements already signed between Brussels and Greenland are presented as an alternative model of cooperation that guarantees Western access to resources without undermining the self-determination of the Greenlandic people.

Beyond the central dispute, this case has brought about a series of unintended consequences. Perhaps the Among these the pressure from the United States is pushing Greenland toward the Chinese investment that the U.S. claims it wants to block, since without reliable Western financing, Nuuk has warned that it might be forced to consider other investors. At the same time, the case sets an uncomfortable precedent for international law, as if a Western power can threaten an ally with economic coercion to secure its territory, Russia and China have an argument to justify similar conduct in their spheres of influence. Added to this is a gap within NATO itself that comes at the worst possible moment, when the alliance is already facing the Russian threat in Eastern Europe. And at the center of it all, almost invisible in the debate

among the great powers, are the Inuit people: 56,000 people whose future is being negotiated by strong economies.

Guiding questions:

1. Greenland
2. Self-determination
3. Rare earths
4. Pituffik
5. GIUK Gap
6. Arctic
7. NATO
8. Sovereignty
9. Multilateralism
10. Inuit

Guiding questions:

1. How can the U.S. security interests in the Arctic be balanced with the Inuit people's right to self-determination and Denmark's territorial integrity?
2. What multilateral mechanisms could ensure Western access to Greenland's rare earth elements without resorting to coercion?
3. Given the paralysis of the Arctic Council and China's growing presence, what role should the G20 play in the governance of this region?
4. What impact would U.S. pressure on an allied nation to acquire Greenland have on NATO, and how should G20 countries respond?
5. How can global dependence on Chinese rare earth elements be reduced without undermining the sovereignty of small territories like Greenland?

For more information go to:

https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/explainer-geopolitical-significance-greenland (Geopolitical significance of Greenland)

https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/greenland-un-experts-urge-united-states-respect-international-law-and-right (The United Nations's position)

https://www.ibanet.org/Greenland-crisis-to-have-significant-implications-for-international-order (Implications for the international order)

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